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Jeffrey Yasskin

Running for the W3C TAG

I’m running for the W3C TAG this year. I was thrilled to see that we got 9 candidates with a wide set of complementary skills and focuses. Tess and Sangwhan have done a great job on the TAG and provide unique perspectives, so it would be a shame if they weren’t re-elected. Lea will provide an important connection to web developers, so it would also be a shame if she weren’t elected. That leaves one more seat for which the right choice is less clear. More than one of the remaining candidates would do a great job in that seat, and I wish there were more seats to put us in, but there aren’t, so you should vote for me.

You should vote for me because I care about many of the same things you care about, and I have deep experience making them compatible with the Web’s strengths and other people’s constraints, and then negotiating them into browsers.

If you work for a member of the W3C, please encourage your AC rep to vote by January 5.

Powerful capabilities §

I designed the Web Bluetooth API and the security UI that gave Chrome, Edge, Samsung Internet, and Opera the confidence to ship it. That security UI enabled a series of follow-on device APIs like WebUSB, Web Serial, WebHID, and Web NFC. These and many of the other Fugu APIs demonstrate how we sometimes have to trade off between capability, safety, and other concerns, but other times we can design features that do better on several axes than what was previously possible.

Taking Bluetooth as an example, it’s clearly less safe to give someone else’s code access to any of your Bluetooth devices, than to turn off that radio. We have a capability-vs-safety tradeoff here, and we can pick various points along that tradeoff:

But we could also have picked a design that isn’t at the Pareto frontier of the tradeoff: if you want to grant a program access to one device, you’d have to grant access to all of your devices at once. This is what all operating systems except the Web do for Bluetooth. So when designing the Web Bluetooth UI, I had an opportunity to move closer to the Pareto frontier when looking at the computer as a whole, even though we also had to shift along that frontier—trade off capability against safety—when looking at the Web by itself.

If you think we need to look for creative ways to add capabilities, security, and privacy when we can do it without sacrificing the others, while also deliberately choosing the tradeoffs when we do need to sacrifice something, vote for me.

An even playing field §

We all benefit when people and businesses with innovative ideas get a chance to show that those ideas are better than the status quo, and we lose those ideas when the systemic effects of the existing architecture give large players an advantage. As Mark Nottingham recently pointed out, the Web’s architecture is “extremely well-adapted to enabling creation of platforms (on top of it) that accrue network effects, where decentralised solutions could have emerged.” The TAG is the right group within the W3C to make recommendations about long-term architectural changes that could resist this pressure.

The TAG is going to need help to make the right tradeoffs here, and to find the right points of leverage to get our changes adopted widely. The tradeoffs can be tricky: sometimes centralization in one area is helping to offset the power of centralized actors in another area. If we introduce a Web feature that decentralizes that first area without also decentralizing the second area, we could cause even more-concentrated power over the whole system. We need to come up with guidelines for making that tradeoff.

The W3C also can’t just adopt a Recommendation for a decentralizing API and expect that developers and users will automatically adopt it. We need to design incentives and evolutionary pressures that are strong enough to overcome the network effects and status quo bias that led to the current centralization. Browsers are one of the strongest levers the W3C has to get its standards adopted, and as a voice within Chrome, I can help figure out how to get access to and use that power.

Productive discussions §

My style is to try to find a way to make everyone in a discussion happy. Often that means noticing where participants are talking past each other or using the same words for different concepts. This was one of my primary contributions as chair of the C++ Library Evolution Working Group. Other times, I’ve had to invent or help the participants invent a way for everyone to get most of what they want, like in the case of the Web Bluetooth chooser UI. In the worst case, I try to find a shared understanding of a small set of core disagreements, which we can continue to discuss even after we’ve picked one or the other side for the immediate decision.

In the W3C, I started the Target Privacy Threat Model to document the places we both agree and disagree about what privacy guarantees the web platform should provide. In addition to focusing privacy discussions on areas we disagree, this model helps feature teams design their features under the right set of constraints. Previously, feature teams would design a feature without knowing what privacy advocates would say about it, and then get into a fight at the end of their development about what parts of the feature they needed to cut. Like the TAG’s Design Principles, the Privacy Threat Model avoids surprises and lets the experts focus on difficult or truly-controversial cases.

Privacy and other human rights §

The W3C has long had a focus on making sure the Web protects certain human rights. The Accessibility, Internationalization, and Privacy horizontal reviews have made sure our Recommendations consider those needs. Both the Accessibility and Privacy groups have recently been doing a good job of considering the end-to-end implications of technical decisions. Accessibility folks have been finding designs such that web developers who are targeting and testing for non-disabled users will accidentally serve users with disabilities as well, and Privacy folks have been defining a threat model to set limits on what a privacy-hostile developer could do with the complete web platform. On the TAG, I will insist that we keep that wide focus over our systems’ higher-order effects, even when the developers between us and our users have different priorities.

More recently, the IETF has created a Human Rights Protocol Considerations research group, and the TAG has started writing a set of Ethical Web Principles. These extend the set of rights that we consider fundamental for users on the Web, and for people affected by the Web. We have much less experience turning these principles into concrete API designs. I’d like to work with the IETF group and draw on the breadth and depth of experience represented by people working in the W3C to turn our principles into tangible change.

What about Google? §

Several groups are concerned about the amount of power Google has in the web ecosystem, and likely worry that electing me will just increase that power. While I do have some biases from working in Google’s environment and having more access to pro-Google arguments, I’m also happy to publicly disagree with Google policy when it’s wrong. Being on the TAG will help me route critical opinions to the right people within Google and will help convince those decision-makers that their preferences have been given a fair hearing if the TAG decides against them.

Vote for me! And the other great candidates! §

Again, the voting deadline is January 5, and every AC member’s vote will be important. If I’m elected, I’m really excited to work with the amazing people running here or already on the TAG. If not, I’m still confident that we’ll have an excellent TAG to shepherd the Web’s architecture for the next year. Happy holidays!

Why do URL-based ad blockers work?

Disclaimer: I work for Google but not on any of the ads teams. This is a personal post.

When Pete Snyder filed WICG/webpackage#551 that Web Bundles might break ad blockers, I had to figure out what makes those ad blockers work in the first place.

Now, obviously, if a page loads an ad from a URL, then blocking that URL will block the ad. But the web is an evolving system, and ad blockers are in an adversarial relationship with publishers, advertisers, and ad-tech companies who all want to make sure users see their ads. Those ad folks are smart and capable of finding ways around naïve attempts to block their ads. So what prevents them from avoiding that list of URLs? Why do URL-based ad blockers keep working?

This post primarily tries to answer that question, not to answer Pete’s concern, but it does eventually come back to web bundles’ effect on ad blocking: they don’t really affect any of the reasons sites haven’t pursued an arms race with ad blockers.

Sites that don’t try to evade §

A user who has installed an ad blocker has sent a pretty clear signal that they don’t want to see ads. Advertisers and publishers may not want to risk angering such users by showing them ads anyway.

And even though around a quarter of all web users use ad blockers, that may still not be enough to pay a publisher to engage in an arms race with ad blockers.

Functionality that needs an online endpoint §

The far bigger reason that ad blockers keep working is that advertisements are usually fetched based on the results of an auction that runs as the surrounding page is downloaded. Whoever runs that auction accepts requests at some URL and responds with ads. That URL is a nice stable target for ad blockers. The auctioneer could dodge the blocker by changing the URL whenever it gets blocked, but then they have to find a way to update all of the publishers’ pages that were written to call that URL. That’s a big logistical problem.

The first thing the auctioneer might try is to have the publishers load a <script src="https://auctioneer.example/auctioneer.js"> that includes the dynamically updating auction endpoint. This is often known as an “ad tag” and is usually the way ads are served even when they’re not trying to avoid ad blockers. But, oops, now the ad blockers are blocking auctioneer.js, and the auctioneer is back to the original problem.

Obfuscate the URL §

It’s straightforward to obfuscate the URL for the auction endpoint, for example by encrypting it with the current date and even a key provided to the particular publisher. The auctioneer can decrypt the request on their server, and run the resulting auction. If the auctioneer isn’t careful, this will lead to their entire domain being blocked, but they might be lucky enough to run a popular website on the same domain, which ad-blocker users would be sad to lose access to. They’ll need to encrypt every resource on the server in the same way to avoid letting the URL-based blockers distinguish.

The bigger problem is that now they have some complicated code copied to every publisher’s page. If that code ever needs to be updated, it’s going to be a problem. And they can’t abstract it into an auctioneer.js for the same reason as before.

Proxy via the first-party server §

The auctioneer could also ask the host of each page to act as a proxy for either the auction request URL or the auctioneer.js posited above. The page would request /any_url_the_publisher_wants.js, and the server would forward that request to the auctioneer and reply with their response. Because of the number of different publishers, it would be difficult for an ad blocker to block all of the script names they picked, and a publisher that wanted to avoid ad blockers could be as creative as they like in rotating those names.

However, this is still more difficult for publishers to adopt than pasting an ad tag on their site, and that difficulty seems to have been enough to stop this technique from being widely adopted. Proxying too much would also make it hard for the auctioneer or advertiser to detect ad fraud, since ad fraud detection currently depends on inspecting connections directly to end-users.

Run a CDN §

The auctioneer could also offer to act as a CDN for publishers that want to avoid ad blockers. By proxying all of the publisher’s content, they can automatically rewrite the ad tags into randomized local references that an ad blocker can’t distinguish from the page’s actual subresources. However, the publisher can only do this with one auctioneer, and they need to trust that auctioneer to do a good job serving all the rest of their content.

What about first-party ads? §

A publisher that sells their own ads might not need to make a separate request for ad blockers to target. Instead, they have a choice between an easy-to-manage URL space with all the ad-related resources in a separate path that ad blockers can target, vs ads mixed indistinguishably among the site’s other resources. The second costs enough development and maintenance time that sites tend not to do it. However, some large sites have chosen to frequently rotate the paths of their ads resources to make it hard for URL-based blockers to keep up.

A first party could also inline ad-related resources into the page itself. Any necessary scripts and styles can be placed at the bottom of the page, and images can either be compiled into the scripts or included with data: URLs. This requires every page of the site to be served dynamically and loses any possible caching benefits from sharing ad resources between pages.

What about non-ad uses of ad blockers? §

It turns out that ad blockers are also used to block other intrusive things, like trackers (including social widgets), big downloads like fonts, fingerprinting scripts, and cryptocurrency miners. Trackers and cryptocurrency miners have to make a network request off the first-party origin in order to send their results, and the URL of that request has to be similarly stable to an ad auction, so ad blockers can block it.

Fingerprinting scripts, on the other hand, only need to report their result to the surrounding page, and some of them provide npm packages for trivial use in website bundlers (like webpack, Rollup, or Parcel). The fingerprinting script can even be bundled with some of the site’s shared code to ensure that it can be cached within the site while ensuring that blocking it will break the site. Ad blockers will only manage to block a fingerprinting script whose host isn’t trying to avoid the blocker.

Big files are easy to re-host locally, but usually aren’t worth the trouble.

How do web bundles affect this? §

Issue #551 claims that Web Bundles make it easier to avoid ad blockers, so how might they do that?

Uses that need an online endpoint will still need one whether or not they’re bundling their code. Ad blockers should continue to target that endpoint. The considerations that make it difficult to move that endpoint around outside a bundle also make it difficult to move it around using bundles.

Uses that only need to get a script to run are already defended by existing Javascript compilers: if a publisher doesn’t care enough about defeating ad blockers to run a compiler, there’s no reason to think they’ll care enough to build a web bundle either.

Bundles provide another way to inline first-party ads, with the improvement of not needing to use data: URLs for images. They come with the same downsides around needing to serve every page dynamically and losing the caching benefits of sharing ad-related resources between pages.

Acknowledgements §

Thanks to Jeff Kaufman, Justin Fagnani, and Michael Kleber for reviewing this post.

This was originally published on Medium.

The Web Bluetooth Security Model

Web Bluetooth is a developing JavaScript API to allow websites to communicate with Bluetooth devices. Sites ask the browser to show a list of nearby Bluetooth devices matching certain criteria, and the user either picks which to grant access to or cancels the dialog.

Image of the Chromium Bluetooth chooser, saying " wants to pair with:" followed by a list of two nearby bluetooth devices, a "Polar H7" or an "HR Monitor GO9". At the bottom of the dialog are links to follow if the expected device doesn"t appear and a "Pair" button.
The user can choose which heart rate monitor to grant access to, if any.

As you might expect, there are security risks here. When deciding whether to ship the new API, we should look at several kinds of attackers and defenders:

  • An abusive software developer, trying to do embarrassing or privacy-insensitive things that don’t go outside devices’ security models.
  • A malicious software developer, trying to exploit users using nearby Bluetooth devices.
  • A malicious hardware manufacturer, trying to exploit users or websites who connect to their devices.
  • A malicious manufacturer/developer, who can push cooperating hardware and software.
  • Weakly-written device firmware, which doesn’t intend to hurt its users, but might be vulnerable to malicious connections.
  • Weakly-written kernels, which might be vulnerable to either malicious userland software or malicious connections.

The ultimate decision about whether to ship Web Bluetooth should also take the competitiveness of the web into account, but this article only analyzes the security tradeoffs.

Abusive software developers §

Abusive websites might try to do embarrassing things like configure a Bluetooth speaker to play porn sounds. Web Bluetooth defends against this in several ways:

  • The chooser grants a website access to only the specific devices a user selects, which helps the user associate misbehavior with specific sites and prevents those sites from messing with extra devices.
  • On desktop platforms we show a tab indicator while a site is connected to a device, which also helps associate the site with the misbehaving device. This isn’t perfect, since the site might configure a device to only misbehave later, long after the site has disconnected to stop showing the tab indicator.
  • If users notice misbehavior and revoke a site’s access to a device, we’re looking into ways to aggregate that in a privacy-preserving way and use it to protect other users from that site, either by automatically denying the chooser or by adding an extra warning that the site might be abusive.

Malicious software developers §

In a world with Web Bluetooth, malicious developers will be able to choose between attacking users via native or web apps. We want shipping Web Bluetooth to make their job harder across the combination of both targets.

Getting permission §

Assume the user visits the malicious developer’s website. To grant it permission to attack Bluetooth devices, the user must:

Android M+:

  1. Click on app install banner.
  2. Click ‘Install’ in Play Store. Wait.
  3. Click ‘Open’ in Play Store.
  4. Click ‘Accept’ on a location permission prompt.


  1. Click on app install banner.
  2. Click ‘Get’ in App Store.
  3. Click ‘Install’ in App Store. Wait.
  4. Click ‘Open’ in App Store.

Chrome OS (through a Chrome App):

  1. Site calls chrome.webstore.install() inside a user gesture.
  2. Click ‘Add’ on a dialog that mentions Bluetooth. Wait.
  3. Click the app icon.

Web Bluetooth

  1. Site calls navigator.bluetooth.requestDevice() inside a user gesture.
  2. Click the vulnerable device inside a dialog that mentions pairing.
  3. Click ‘Pair’.

Web Bluetooth provides more warning to users than Android or iOS before giving access to the first device. Web Bluetooth also requires the same permission sequence for each additional device, so the malicious developer can’t attack devices the user wasn’t aware of.

Getting permission illicitly §

A developer can also hijack a trusted site’s permission to use Bluetooth devices.

  • Native: XcodeGhost demonstrates that it’s possible to compromise native apps at scale, but to do it you need to compromise development machines.
  • Web: Web sites are often compromised to host malware. Even without being compromised, web sites embed ads that shouldn’t be able to access Bluetooth devices. To make sure ads only get access to expected capabilities, Chris Palmer is proposing a permission delegation API, which Web Bluetooth will use.

Web Bluetooth is probably more vulnerable to this type of attack.

Attacking the kernel through Bluetooth APIs §

The kernel or Bluetooth drivers may be vulnerable to attack from the local machine, or from a remote radio as discussed below. The main defense we have here is to keep the API surface small and to run fuzz tests over that API. Web Bluetooth is helped by the GATT API being relatively small.

Attacking through non-Bluetooth channels §

A user who wants to access a Bluetooth device will follow instructions for how to do so. This may allow other attacks:

  • Native apps find it easier to escape the system sandbox than web apps, at least because web apps have to escape a browser sandbox before even attempting to attack the system.
  • Native apps have more abilities by default than web apps. For example, native apps have raw network access, can execute in the background, and can track users through a persistent advertising ID.
  • Android M+ requires the user grant access to their location in order for an app to communicate over Bluetooth.

If we ship Web Bluetooth, users can get used to simple uses working on the web, which will help restrict the more dangerous native apps to the cases they’re actually needed.

Avoiding blockage §

Before a site or app is discovered to be malicious:

  • Native: App stores have full access to an app’s code and can test it for malicious behavior on hardware they pick. However, because each kind of remote Bluetooth device may speak a different protocol and have different vulnerabilities, the stores basically can’t test for malice and have to allow any messages they don’t know to be harmful.
  • Web: We can’t do an offline scan of a website, but app stores aren’t benefitting from offline scans in this case anyway. We can block the known-harmful messages using an updatable registry of blacklisted services.

After a site or app is discovered to be malicious:

  • Native: Stores can take down all apps uploaded under a single credit card.
  • Web: Safe Browsing can block access to the single malicious website.

Web Bluetooth should be just as good at preventing attacks ahead of time, but doesn’t have as strong a response after we discover an attack.

Attacking the device §

  • Native: The app has access to both GATT and Bluetooth Classic profiles. Classic profiles are byte-stream-based, which makes them harder to parse and more likely to be exploitable. As mentioned above, native apps can also attack all devices in radio range, the entire time they’re installed, without going back through a user prompt.
  • Web: Sites can only communicate over the relatively simple GATT protocol, which maps keys to bounded-length values. Sites can also only attack devices the user explicitly granted access to.

Web Bluetooth does not take the extra CORS-like step of asking devices to opt into the origins that are allowed to communicate with them, but is still less likely to give access to exploitable device code.

Some Bluetooth devices intentionally allow firmware updates over a GATT channel. For example, Nordic Semiconductor has defined a Device Firmware Update service with a default implementation in their SDK. Unfortunately this implementation doesn’t check the update’s signature, which could enable an attack along the lines of the iSeeYou attack on USB. As a result, Web Bluetooth will probably add this service to the blacklist, and restrict unsigned updates to native apps. Firmware update services that do check signatures would not need to be blacklisted.

Malicious hardware manufacturers §

Websites that don’t know about Web Bluetooth aren’t affected by its existence, because they have to make an explicit function call to opt into it.

Because users get to choose the device they connect to a website, websites have to design around being given an incorrect device. They may still make incorrect and exploitable assumptions about how the device will respond to their messages. That said, this only affects the single exploited website: browser sandboxing prevents the damage from leaking to other sites.

Malicious hardware may also be able to work alone to attack a user’s computer, as described in the next section.

Malicious hardware manufacturers who also write websites §

Remote devices can also attempt to exploit a user’s computer. The most well-known example of this is innocent-looking USB devices that behave as keyboards or mice when plugged in. I’m told that neither apps nor browsers can pair with Bluetooth devices in a way that makes the devices into trusted keyboards, but I haven’t seen a reliable published source saying this.

Devices may also be able to attack a user’s kernel, possibly through their Bluetooth drivers. We haven’t yet fuzz-tested this attack surface, but we plan to before shipping the API.

The Physical Web makes it easier for malicious hardware to get users onto their website, than it would be to get them to install a native app. Web Bluetooth needs to validate that remote hardware can’t attack users’ systems through this route.

Conclusion §

  • Web Bluetooth’s ability to pair an application with a single remote device is a big advance toward the principle of least privilege.
  • Reducing the number of native apps users need to install is another big advance given the general power of native apps.
  • Some users’ devices probably will be exploited by malicious websites using Web Bluetooth. We believe the other security benefits will outweigh this.
  • We need to run several more security tests before shipping the API, including fuzzing several operating systems and testing that they don’t automatically grant access for devices to act as keyboards.

Acknowledgements §

Thanks to Adrienne Porter Felt, Chris Palmer, Xifumi, Giovanni Ortuño, Vincent Scheib, Alex Russell, and François Beaufort for reviewing this. Any remaining mistakes are still mine.

This was originally published on Medium.