Science
In the sciences (though not in fields like medicine, technology, and law, of which the principal raison d’être is an external social need), the formation of specialized journals, the foundation of specialists’ societies, and the claim for a special place in the curriculum have usually been associated with a group’s first reception of a single paradigm. At least this was the case between the time, a century and a half ago, when the institutional pattern of scientific specialization first developed and the very recent time when the paraphernalia of specialization acquired a prestige of their own.
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, page 19
Part of this book’s claim is that it’s not falsifiability that makes something science. While so far Kuhn hasn’t mentioned them, creationists are actually right when they say that evolution is not falsifiable, because “normal” scientific work is the process of tweaking the theory to make it fit the world, not testing a theory with an eye to throwing it out if it doesn’t fit. If a theory doesn’t fit the world, scientists still won’t give it up until another theory comes along to replace it. And yet creationism can’t claim to be the successor to evolution because it doesn’t provide a foundation for future scientific work. To be scientific, a theory has to propose useful experiments or studies that can elaborate the theory, and I’ve never seen any kind of creationism do that.
It seems to me that you’re putting yourself in the position of saying that truths don’t have to be scientific. This might be true, it’s just not the usual position taken by most “scientific” people.
You say that creationism isn’t scientific. Fair enough. But surely, you’d say that it’s at least a possibility that it might be true, after all, proving a negative is pretty difficult. So if it is true, then it’s not scientific?
Does a theory really have to propose “useful” experiments? I’m assuming that by useful, you mean possible? And what types of experiments, in the instance of creationism would you be willing to accept?
If you take evolution, for example, you can say things like “If our theory is correct, we should see certain similarities between these groups of animals, and differences between these similar animals that have been separated” and so forth. Now maybe this isn’t the type of experiments you are talking about, but if it is, the same things can be said of creationism. “If our theory is correct, and an intelligent being has designed mankind, we should see some order and structure in humans.” Alot of it depends on what your presuppositions are.
Scientists don’t usually claim that their art is merely a matter to catalogue observations, but rather a tool for advancing both predictability and more importantly truths about the world around us. But really, there are a million ways to explain things, we can come up with a formula for gravitational pull, and atomic cohesion but the idea of gravity and its cause and of atomic cohesion have no explanation. They are just made up to patch holes that offer no “useful experiment” for their existence or truth. One could just as easily start with a god and say that god makes sure all those formulas work instead of this “gravity” thing.
Comment by Dan Graham — 9/6/2006 @ 12:07 am UTC
Right, truths aren’t necessarily scientific, and creationism might be true. By “useful”, I meant that the theory itself defines the experiments as useful. I can’t provide any outside definition without proposing my own theory, rather than the metatheory I have here.
So, evolution says that studying certain groups of animals will give useful-according-to-evolution results. Conversely, creationism says that experimental investigation is pointless because we’ve already seen that order and structure in humans.
Comment by Jeffrey Yasskin — 10/22/2006 @ 5:04 am UTC